The Argument from Metaphysical Possibility

Having had time to digest these thoughts for a while now, I think this argument actually bears some similarity to the concept of fixed arbitration, which relies on an analogy of linguistics coupled with a belief in property dualism. However, this argument is more strictly from the nature of possibility.

Here are my working premises.

1. Metaphysical possibility, or "pure" possibility, is unchanging. So, for example, a unicorn is always "purely" possible.

2. Nomological possibility, or possibility within the laws of the universe, does not account for all possibility, but only the realm of possibility within those natural laws, such as gravity, electro-magnetism.

3. Circumstantial possibility arises from a network of causes, usually within a set of nomological rules and events.

Each level of possibility closes the possibility-to-actuality ratio. So in pure possibility, unicorns are 100% possible. It is also, however, 100% possible that no unicorns exist. While things which contradict logically, such as 1+1=3 or square circles, are not admissible into the realm of metaphysical possibility, things which contradict in a nomological or cirumstantially specified moment of logical appraisal, are not necessarily contradictory in the realm of pure possibility. So to say that unicorns are 100% possible, and that the non-existence of unicorns is also 100% possible, is not here contradictory. There is no nomological or circumstantial "friction," if you will, coming in the way of these logical concepts.

Nomological rules close the gap. Every rule of the universe we add makes certain possibilities less likely. If we add in the law of gravity, the ability to fly on a very large planet becomes less likely. Rules we live with, such as fire is hot, make it difficult for purely possible propositions like "Ice cubes don't melt in fire" to be actualized. So let's say, somewhat arbitrarily, that the laws of our universe reduce the possibility of unicorns existing to 35%. We'll say that evolution could still result in the possibility of unicorns, and if they also developed intelligence, they might be able to learn some sort of technology which, to a medieval mind (when the unicorn became popular) would explain the idea that unicorns have 'magic.' We are, by the way, supposing magic as we understand it (being able to bend the laws of nature, cast spells, etc), as ruled out, since that is the popular conception of magic. If we are committed to a fully magical unicorn, that will reduce the nomological possibility greatly - of course, there is here something of a discrepency between what we consider to be nomological possibility and what actually is a nomological possibility, but let us leave that aside for the moment.

Within the nomological realm, the unicorn remains possible but takes a little more work to get to. Within the context, however, of the studies of science, biology, and animal life, and a critical modern eye to medieval historical texts, we have come to reduce the nomological possibility of the unicorn to probably something less than 1%. I don't say zero because a true zero percentage would require a pure logical fallacy, and unicorns are not a pure logical fallacy. Within the context of natural law and circumstance, however, the existence of the unicorn is probably reducible to a point where it is something like about zero for even the most troublesome philosopher, and probably zero in the common sense perception of most people. You can see that possibility is a very complicated thing, because there are really not three layers of possibility, but three general layers, and especially within nomological and circumstantial possibility there can be a lot of possibility remaining. In fact, natural law and circumstances not only narrow, but also increase possibility, in one sense, because actually having stairs make it possible to actually climb them, whereas taking away the stairs makes it less circumstantially possible to climb them but not less metaphysically or naturally possible.

In general, though, circumstance (under which we can sort of sweep natural law if we are being imprecise) limits possibility. Circumstance allows for a vast array of possibility within its scope, but makes other perfectly possible things in the realm of logic very hard. It would be very difficult for me to get to China from my living room, given the circumstances of natural law and the actual location of my living room (natural law + circumstance), but in metaphysical possibility nothing says I couldn't just pop over to China without any effort whatsoever; I could just teleport there. As of now, however, getting to China from my room (as in, without going out the door, getting to an airport or so forth but just staying in my apartment) is pretty much zero, if not philosophically zero.

Let us return to the unicorn example. We have said that unicorns are at about zero for common sense perception, when we add together our assumptions about natural law with the circumstances of how evolution happened to turn and the degrees of reliability of historical and scientific inquiry. But we have also said that the concept "unicorns exist" and the concept "unicorns do not exist" are both perfectly good. We could say, indeed, that they are both 100% possibilities, because none of the limiting factors of natural law or circumstance exist. It is hard to see these possibilities as random; quite the opposite, they are 100% possible in pure or "metaphysical" terms. It is also not clear to me what their "cause" is; this is just the nature of the concept being considered. In some sense, then, it seems that the existence and non-existence of unicorns, and indeed of everything within the realm of possibility, stands in a very strange place in relationship to a hard determinist world view. What, especially, happens when we are looking at a human choice, which is not only capable of considering metaphysical possibility, but seems to be, on this planet, the discoverer of the notion? What happens when the will inclines to this option, if you will?

Now, obviously we don't choose between unicorns existing and not in our day to day activities. What we choose between are things like dating or not dating, eating or not eating, red or blue, karate or wrestling, school or the military, and so forth. When we look over possibilities, we generally attend to circumstantial possibility, which branches out of nomological possibility from metaphysical possibility. We assume, without realizing it, that our choice must be possible in the absolute sense, or we wouldn't be considering the options. We instead look at circumstances, at the limiting factors which make option A or option B desirable choices.

Here is what I propose. Every choice presents two possibilities which we see as possible at every level. A circumstantial possibility must be possible nomologically, which requires it to be possible metaphysically. Metaphysically impossible choices are not possible within circumstance, though metaphysically possible choices are sometimes impossible circumstantially and naturally. If a choice can be made from 100% true and 100% false, both of which are present in our choice, in a choice which "goes all the way up" the chain of possibility, as it were, perhaps it is here where we find freedom. A choice made purely out of circumstance is limited in that it does not perceive the full range of possibilities; it is made in errors about fuller circles of possibility within which we choose. When the choice is between two truly, fully possible events, the will is being moved not by partialities but is moving through two absolutes. Now we have to admit for partial possibilities within the lives of human beings; as I always insist, total free will is not a logical concept. Free will is only entertainable to the degree that we act from an awareness of a fuller account of possibility, where the choice moves not merely from one circumstantial possibility to the next, but taps into the metaphysical absolute possibilities, where a choice being made is not random because that choice is the 100% choice of metaphysical possibility, and not caused because the will had the other option of 100% opposing, in the frictionless metaphysical world, possibility.

I will take the easier objection I can think of first, which is this: Well, how could human choice possibly unfold from this metaphysical possibility? The answer is, well, I do not know, but we know that it happens. The universe which exists is, in a very loose sense of the word, a sort of "choice," that is to say, the universe could, metaphysically speaking, have been some other way. We can imagine it quite consistently, if we had enough time to do so, with very different rules and circumstances. So as it happens, the universe itself attests to the actuality of limiting metaphysical possibility or navigating it; how much greater can the will do so, if it can actually look over metaphysical possibility?

The second question is, of course, the direct attack on libertarianism: Even supposing at the will is capable of choosing between two absolute metaphysical possibilities, how can it be said that the will is free, when there is still a "why" or a reason involved in the choosing? Well, first of all, my attempt has been to loosen the determinist perspective of caused versus random, which I think this achieves, even if it does not address this objection. I am not convinced that having a "reason" for an action limits free will in the same way as other causes, if the reason in question is a Reason, not a Cause, if that makes sense. Circumstance and natural law is a part of our lives, and escaping that is impossible. Free will must be considered as a temporal event which occurs with the right arrangement of causes, as I indicated in the previous post, not the elimination of causal force on the will. When the will finds its reason for acting in a sort of interdisciplinary fashion, being able to move when desirable from the levels of possibility, not only in thought but, within a context, actually in force of will, into the realm of metaphysical possibility, and make choices from that station, looking down upon circumstantial, partial possibilities to choose among those circumstantial choices from their origin as metaphysical absolutes, then the will is as free as it may become, under this conception. Thus within the circumstance, the will moves freely between choices A and B afforded by that circumstance, even if at another level the will is moved by considerations of metaphysical possibility. Free will thus arises from, and is not independent of, logic and possibility far greater than itself. Freedom, moreover, is learned under this conception, and can be increased or decreased depending upon the level of possibility to which both thought and will attend.

I recognize some difficulties in the argument presented, especially in dealing with the last objection. However, I think this final argument, along with the previous five, are enough to cast plausible doubt on the case of hard determinism, permitting those who want at least a general libertarian perspective, without resorting to a simple compatibilism which merely changes the definition of free will (as opposed to the compatibilism I articulate, which does not admit for a full free will but does permit a real possibility between choosing A or B and seeks to loosen, not work within, the framework of hard determinism). Perhaps these arguments will serve, once objections to them have been more fully made and responses more fully considered, as starting points for creating, some day, a more robust libertarian philosophy.