The Nature of Experience

Alright, I just think it is time to slap up another one of my free will arguments. I've been away for way too long at this point, and my philosophy is rustier than the Platonic Form of Rust. So forgive me if I am a little convoluted or am just spewing nonsense!

This is the argument from Number 1: The Nature of Experience. My argument here is that it is in the nature of feeling free that demonstrates the metaphysical possibility of free will, regardless of whether we are actually free. Unlike my previous post, I am not here arguing against the specific tenets of hard determinism; that is to say, I am not arguing against the premise that our choices are either caused or random. I am merely positing that there is something about the experience which makes it true.

Now, we can reasonably assume that many things we experience make something metaphysically possible, but not nomologically possible.. If I believe that I am stronger than a lion, my experience of this belief does not change anything. I can believe this wholeheartedly, but that does not alter whether I am actually stronger than a lion. However, in terms of pure possibility, I could be stronger than a lion. Seeing as though I never work out and have poor eating habits, and am of a species which is generally weaker than a lion, the possibility of my strength surpassing such a creature is pretty small. However, it seems that it is logically possible that we could live in a world where I am stronger than a lion, or a person very much like me is stronger than a lion. Circumstances of environment, evolution, habit, and so forth prevent this from being the case, but insofar as it can be imagined, it is theoretically possible.

On the other hand, there are some things which are theoretically impossible. It is impossible for a shape to be both square and triangle at the same time, and truly be those shapes. It is impossible for 2+2 to come out with anything other than 4, provided that we are thinking about the meaning of the signs and not the signs themselves. These tend to be mathematical, I suppose. I cannot think of any logical impossibilities which are not definitional or mathematical. A bachelor cannot be married, you cannot divide by zero. Things which seem contradictory in our world are often not in this loose realm of possibility: I could run faster than myself if I go back to when I am a baby and run around my earlier self as an older, faster self. But there are still certain things which can't happen: I can't be in two places at once as the same myself (the present and past mes are not actually the same self). The question is, does the nature of choice fall into these kinds of possibility? Is free will logically impossible?

Well, let's see. I can imagine myself eating a bowl of cereal, or not eating a bowl of cereal. Both scenarios are equally imaginable, whereas the concept of something really being two and another thing really being two and really adding them together and getting five is simply not imaginable. Perhaps, in fact, I am just fooled. I mean, I can imagine the earth being flat, but that doesn't make the earth flat. However, the flatness of the earth is not the same as possibility. The imagination can fool us into thinking something is real when it is not if it is logically possible; but logical impossibilities do not seem imaginable. Even with the hard determinist's argument in line, I can consistently imagine myself choosing to eat a bowl of cereal or to, say, hang-glide, instead. (Note that I am using imagination in the most basic sense, not the more loaded Romantic sense I will employ later for another blog. Also note that while I am using possibility in multiple blogs, the logic is not circular since these are separate arguments).

Perhaps we do not understand what we are imagining. I may not understand my mental faculties, may not understand the ways in which social norms, evolution, biology and other factors are influencing my choices. Perhaps if I did understand myself and the universe perfectly, imagining two possible actions would be impossible. These, unfortunately, are bad examples, though, because they are all arguments which proceed from things which operate in a realm of post-nomological possibility. That is to say, those things influencing my decision are not due to the metaphysical nature of choice, but to circumstances which may or may not impede my ability to choose. For example, if we say that I have the ability to walk, and then tie my legs to a chair, I still, in a sense, have the ability to walk. Circumstances have prevented me from being able to use that ability, but it is still a present ability. This too is a miss analogy, since it is still looking at the problem within post-nomological possibility. So we will remove it further: Let us say that my legs are cut off. We can still say that, if I had legs, I would be able to walk, since logically the metaphysical concept of walking is acceptable. So any arguments which say that we do not have free will because of fate, social construction, or other nomological and post-nomological circumstances, fail to appreciate the question of free will in terms of a pure metaphysics.

The argument of hard determinism operates in a pure logic world, and attempts to establish free will as false because actions can only either be caused or random. It is metaphysically in the nature of a person's choice, they say, that those choices be caused or random. My response to this is that metaphysical impossibilities cannot be imagined, and free will can be imagined. This is sort of like hunger. If I experience hunger, then I know that hunger is a real thing to experience. Even if a scientist is tweaking a brain in a vat that thinks it is Anthony, that mental state is experiencing something which really exists. More precisely phrased, feeling hungry makes you hungry. If I am physically satisfied, but have a disorder which makes me hungry when I have eaten enough, it is not that I am fooled into thinking I am hungry when I am not. It is in the nature of feeling hungry that makes one hungry; feeling as though you are in pain makes you actually in pain, even if what you think is causing you pain is actually not, and it is only your perception that it hurts which is making you hurt. I submit that free will is of this category of experience, that the sensation of freeness is what makes one free. Now, a scientist may learn to make a brain in a vat feel free, and so we can say, ah, but free will could still merely be an illusion! Here is where it gets tricky.

It is simpler with hunger, because the experience of hunger makes you hungry. On the other hand, one might experience no freedom and yet have free will, ostensibly, and one might experience freedom in a situation where one is not really free. The qualia of freeness does not mean that you are able to act upon your freedom: it is simply the imaginable experience of freedom which makes freedom possible. In other words, if I am sitting here feeling unfree, I can still imagine a situation where I do feel free, and so in a sense am still experiencing myself as the kind of being who COULD have free will. Essentially, the experience of this concept of freedom, not the experience of freedom itself, is much like experiencing hunger. Having experienced the concept of free will, I know that it is a possible state, because logical impossibilities cannot be admitted into the imagination. This is a sort of Cartesian argument, I suppose, and the strongest argument against it remains that we could be fooled that something is possible, when it is not. I reply that if this is the case, then we must come to question a great many other things which we deem possible. Furthermore, if we can be fooled that something is logically possible, then we could also be fooled whether something is logically impossible. If that is the case, and whether something can be imagined as impossible is not a valid test, then the concept of logical impossibility falls apart, and we are left in a world of total possibility, where even logic provides no impossibilities. If this happens then the hard determinist argument fails, since they use logic to disprove free will. So, logical impossibilities are needed because nomological and post-nomological arguments cannot disprove free will, but the fact that it is simply a person's judgment which renders a concept as logically impossible or possible which further makes it possible that I could choose to do A or B. I can consistently imagine myself doing either A or B; in other words, I experience myself as a free being whose freedom may be limited, or not limited, by circumstances. The hard determinist argument may cause me to say, "I cannot explain how a choice can be neither caused nor random," however, I can still hold this in view and experience myself as a being who can do A or B. Because their argument does not render this capability void, because when I go to make a choice I still see myself as being able to make a choice, the nature of this experience of freedom indicates that I am actually free.