In the previous post, I involved the imagination in the defense of free will. It was more of a sideline premise in supporting my argument; here the imagination takes center stage.
Recall that the hard determinist's metaphysical argument against free will is, roughly summarized, that because things in the universe can only be caused or random (or maybe some combination thereof), free will is an incoherent notion. My reply is that causation and randomness are both concepts created by the mind in order to understand the universe; while they may have a basis in reality, "cause" is a narrative created by an observer to "explain" an event. The first argument I posted attempted to posit a third way things can exist, that is to say, in a state of "fixed arbitration" which is somehow neither caused nor random. The second argument I posted argues that free will seems metaphysically possible from the fact that it is imaginable, regardless of our status as free or unfree. My argument here is that, as a method of understanding the world, the logic of hard determinism, while generally valid, becomes problematic when applied to the function of human thought in a draconic fashion. It is generally a good precept to assume that there is a logical reason for phenomenon in the universe, but this precept is one used for apprehension of the ostensibly non-conscious universe. For consciousness to work, logic must be assumed to work. However, if we are to join the hard determinist in attempting to explain conscious thought in a formula such as theirs against free will, then the logic which they use to disprove free will is as much available for philosophical attack as free will itself.
So, then, why should our beliefs be logical? A "logical" reason is not enough. We could say that the reason beliefs should be logical is that is what rational beings do; they use logic. But "rational" has the word logic hidden in it. Indeed, it seems difficult to answer the question, "Why should beliefs be logical?" without sneaking in the word logic somewhere. Certainly, the logician can reply, well, logic is to be augmented by the senses and emotion, and this is to be agreed. But why should we believe that this pairing is to be trusted? After all, the senses and logic have, when working together, failed human beings in the past. And, if we are going to let the senses enter into this philosophical conversation, we could possibly suggest that I "sense" that my actions are free; should not our logic admit the truth of that perception?
However, the logicians attempt to answer that beliefs should be logical ultimately pushes us either into a circle, or admit that there is another sort of faculty which we must look to. "Experience" which shows us that logic is reliable is not a good enough explanation, for it takes logic to show us that experience is valuable, much the same as it takes logic for repeated exposure to phenomenon to ever become induction. Without logic, any senses are simply inarticulate blobs of experience which cannot admit knowledge; but why does belief seem more trustworthy when it is supported with logic than not? There is no way getting around this fact: beliefs which are shown to be logical to the mind are more believable. But the belief, "Beliefs are better if logical," cannot come from logic, for circular reasoning is forbidden by logic. And sensory experience, as well as cultural experience, cannot supply the answer, because without logic these are all merely amorphous, unconnected feelings that have no "logic" to them - that we are so convinced that these disparate experiences can be bound up in logic suggests a faith which, in some sense, goes beyond logic. I propose this belief, "Beliefs should be logical," comes not from a principle of logic (or it would be circular) but from a different sort of belief-forming principle or faculty, the imagination.
Now, it may seem too quick to assume that there is a whole faculty from the discovery of a single principle which is not strictly logical. Again, some exchange between reason and the senses could be argued to create this principle, but I believe that position devolves into incoherence, as I hope I have sufficiently shown above. In case not, let me repeat it in another way: Should we say that belief in logic's place in belief forming comes from the senses, we are pre-supposing the role of the senses as supplying fuel for logic to work with, thus implicitly admitting logic into our answer. We need to fully abolish logic for a brief moment to satisfy the logician's demands of non-circular reasoning, and the only way to do so is to suppose a mental faculty which is non-rational. This faculty must, in some ways, be sort of like reason and sort of like the senses. It is like reason in that it is not experienced as part of the world as the senses are; we do not "sense" mathematics in the world, strictly speaking, much as we do not "sense" the fact that "beliefs should be logical." However, like the senses, this faculty has the inability to disagree with what it experiences. So, while rationally someone may posit that not all beliefs need be logical, whether they believe this is controlled by this other faculty. Reason is, in some ways, more at our disposal, because we can let it move out of the realm of our actual beliefs. This faculty, in a strange way, is out of our control (though not completely), but is at least difficult for us to manage, as the senses are difficult for us to manage, because we cannot argue with what it tells us to belief very easily. So when we are told, "Beliefs should be logical," it comes with a force which is so powerful, even asking the question seems preposterous, although we cannot clearly articulate why.
Further, I argue that since this faculty exists, we should suspect that it will be involved in other belief forming activities. It may be the case that "Beliefs should be logical" is the only use of this faculty, but that would be odd, and once admitting to the existence of the faculty, ruling out its use in other cognition seems baseless. After all, if I can prove to you that only one unicorn exists, or only one Hittite, then you will be less skeptical that other unicorns or other Hittites do in fact exist. As it stands, I have no unicorns, but Hittites have been found, so it will be easy to convince you that Hittites other than thee ones we exactly know about have been around; as for unicorns, it's hard to convince you of the third and twentieth unicorns if I haven't proven the first. Should the role of the imaginative faculty in "Beliefs should be logical" draw any support from my reader, then it should be agreed easily that the imaginative faculty must have a role in other belief forming principles. I argue, then, that free will is one of these beliefs. Free will is a belief which we may disagree with rationally, and yet even the hard determinist thinks about things to make decisions on them. They may not want to call this free will, but if a hard determinist is thinking, "Should I turn off the television and go to bed, or watch one more episode?" the hard determinist has the experience that either option is possible. He may not rationally belief this to be free, but that experience is, indeed, the definition of freedom: that two different options are actually possible at one moment. And indeed, the hard determinist does, I think, experience that both are possible, even if he would rationally tell us that he believes this experience to be an illusion. This demonstrates, I think, that the free will belief is like the "Beliefs should be logical belief," and other beliefs which arise out of the Romantic imagination proposed by Wordsworth, Coleridge and Blake. Should we have come this far, to admit the existence of the imagination and admit its role in the premise of logical beliefs, to reject its validity in its role in the belief of free will would undermine its role in the belief of logical beliefs. I submit, therefore, that free will is a power of the mind discovered by the imagination, which makes sense why the hard determinist, in attempting to explain decision making through logic alone, must necessarily fail.
Saturday, August 14, 2010
Thursday, February 25, 2010
The Nature of Experience
Alright, I just think it is time to slap up another one of my free will arguments. I've been away for way too long at this point, and my philosophy is rustier than the Platonic Form of Rust. So forgive me if I am a little convoluted or am just spewing nonsense!
This is the argument from Number 1: The Nature of Experience. My argument here is that it is in the nature of feeling free that demonstrates the metaphysical possibility of free will, regardless of whether we are actually free. Unlike my previous post, I am not here arguing against the specific tenets of hard determinism; that is to say, I am not arguing against the premise that our choices are either caused or random. I am merely positing that there is something about the experience which makes it true.
Now, we can reasonably assume that many things we experience make something metaphysically possible, but not nomologically possible.. If I believe that I am stronger than a lion, my experience of this belief does not change anything. I can believe this wholeheartedly, but that does not alter whether I am actually stronger than a lion. However, in terms of pure possibility, I could be stronger than a lion. Seeing as though I never work out and have poor eating habits, and am of a species which is generally weaker than a lion, the possibility of my strength surpassing such a creature is pretty small. However, it seems that it is logically possible that we could live in a world where I am stronger than a lion, or a person very much like me is stronger than a lion. Circumstances of environment, evolution, habit, and so forth prevent this from being the case, but insofar as it can be imagined, it is theoretically possible.
On the other hand, there are some things which are theoretically impossible. It is impossible for a shape to be both square and triangle at the same time, and truly be those shapes. It is impossible for 2+2 to come out with anything other than 4, provided that we are thinking about the meaning of the signs and not the signs themselves. These tend to be mathematical, I suppose. I cannot think of any logical impossibilities which are not definitional or mathematical. A bachelor cannot be married, you cannot divide by zero. Things which seem contradictory in our world are often not in this loose realm of possibility: I could run faster than myself if I go back to when I am a baby and run around my earlier self as an older, faster self. But there are still certain things which can't happen: I can't be in two places at once as the same myself (the present and past mes are not actually the same self). The question is, does the nature of choice fall into these kinds of possibility? Is free will logically impossible?
Well, let's see. I can imagine myself eating a bowl of cereal, or not eating a bowl of cereal. Both scenarios are equally imaginable, whereas the concept of something really being two and another thing really being two and really adding them together and getting five is simply not imaginable. Perhaps, in fact, I am just fooled. I mean, I can imagine the earth being flat, but that doesn't make the earth flat. However, the flatness of the earth is not the same as possibility. The imagination can fool us into thinking something is real when it is not if it is logically possible; but logical impossibilities do not seem imaginable. Even with the hard determinist's argument in line, I can consistently imagine myself choosing to eat a bowl of cereal or to, say, hang-glide, instead. (Note that I am using imagination in the most basic sense, not the more loaded Romantic sense I will employ later for another blog. Also note that while I am using possibility in multiple blogs, the logic is not circular since these are separate arguments).
Perhaps we do not understand what we are imagining. I may not understand my mental faculties, may not understand the ways in which social norms, evolution, biology and other factors are influencing my choices. Perhaps if I did understand myself and the universe perfectly, imagining two possible actions would be impossible. These, unfortunately, are bad examples, though, because they are all arguments which proceed from things which operate in a realm of post-nomological possibility. That is to say, those things influencing my decision are not due to the metaphysical nature of choice, but to circumstances which may or may not impede my ability to choose. For example, if we say that I have the ability to walk, and then tie my legs to a chair, I still, in a sense, have the ability to walk. Circumstances have prevented me from being able to use that ability, but it is still a present ability. This too is a miss analogy, since it is still looking at the problem within post-nomological possibility. So we will remove it further: Let us say that my legs are cut off. We can still say that, if I had legs, I would be able to walk, since logically the metaphysical concept of walking is acceptable. So any arguments which say that we do not have free will because of fate, social construction, or other nomological and post-nomological circumstances, fail to appreciate the question of free will in terms of a pure metaphysics.
The argument of hard determinism operates in a pure logic world, and attempts to establish free will as false because actions can only either be caused or random. It is metaphysically in the nature of a person's choice, they say, that those choices be caused or random. My response to this is that metaphysical impossibilities cannot be imagined, and free will can be imagined. This is sort of like hunger. If I experience hunger, then I know that hunger is a real thing to experience. Even if a scientist is tweaking a brain in a vat that thinks it is Anthony, that mental state is experiencing something which really exists. More precisely phrased, feeling hungry makes you hungry. If I am physically satisfied, but have a disorder which makes me hungry when I have eaten enough, it is not that I am fooled into thinking I am hungry when I am not. It is in the nature of feeling hungry that makes one hungry; feeling as though you are in pain makes you actually in pain, even if what you think is causing you pain is actually not, and it is only your perception that it hurts which is making you hurt. I submit that free will is of this category of experience, that the sensation of freeness is what makes one free. Now, a scientist may learn to make a brain in a vat feel free, and so we can say, ah, but free will could still merely be an illusion! Here is where it gets tricky.
It is simpler with hunger, because the experience of hunger makes you hungry. On the other hand, one might experience no freedom and yet have free will, ostensibly, and one might experience freedom in a situation where one is not really free. The qualia of freeness does not mean that you are able to act upon your freedom: it is simply the imaginable experience of freedom which makes freedom possible. In other words, if I am sitting here feeling unfree, I can still imagine a situation where I do feel free, and so in a sense am still experiencing myself as the kind of being who COULD have free will. Essentially, the experience of this concept of freedom, not the experience of freedom itself, is much like experiencing hunger. Having experienced the concept of free will, I know that it is a possible state, because logical impossibilities cannot be admitted into the imagination. This is a sort of Cartesian argument, I suppose, and the strongest argument against it remains that we could be fooled that something is possible, when it is not. I reply that if this is the case, then we must come to question a great many other things which we deem possible. Furthermore, if we can be fooled that something is logically possible, then we could also be fooled whether something is logically impossible. If that is the case, and whether something can be imagined as impossible is not a valid test, then the concept of logical impossibility falls apart, and we are left in a world of total possibility, where even logic provides no impossibilities. If this happens then the hard determinist argument fails, since they use logic to disprove free will. So, logical impossibilities are needed because nomological and post-nomological arguments cannot disprove free will, but the fact that it is simply a person's judgment which renders a concept as logically impossible or possible which further makes it possible that I could choose to do A or B. I can consistently imagine myself doing either A or B; in other words, I experience myself as a free being whose freedom may be limited, or not limited, by circumstances. The hard determinist argument may cause me to say, "I cannot explain how a choice can be neither caused nor random," however, I can still hold this in view and experience myself as a being who can do A or B. Because their argument does not render this capability void, because when I go to make a choice I still see myself as being able to make a choice, the nature of this experience of freedom indicates that I am actually free.
This is the argument from Number 1: The Nature of Experience. My argument here is that it is in the nature of feeling free that demonstrates the metaphysical possibility of free will, regardless of whether we are actually free. Unlike my previous post, I am not here arguing against the specific tenets of hard determinism; that is to say, I am not arguing against the premise that our choices are either caused or random. I am merely positing that there is something about the experience which makes it true.
Now, we can reasonably assume that many things we experience make something metaphysically possible, but not nomologically possible.. If I believe that I am stronger than a lion, my experience of this belief does not change anything. I can believe this wholeheartedly, but that does not alter whether I am actually stronger than a lion. However, in terms of pure possibility, I could be stronger than a lion. Seeing as though I never work out and have poor eating habits, and am of a species which is generally weaker than a lion, the possibility of my strength surpassing such a creature is pretty small. However, it seems that it is logically possible that we could live in a world where I am stronger than a lion, or a person very much like me is stronger than a lion. Circumstances of environment, evolution, habit, and so forth prevent this from being the case, but insofar as it can be imagined, it is theoretically possible.
On the other hand, there are some things which are theoretically impossible. It is impossible for a shape to be both square and triangle at the same time, and truly be those shapes. It is impossible for 2+2 to come out with anything other than 4, provided that we are thinking about the meaning of the signs and not the signs themselves. These tend to be mathematical, I suppose. I cannot think of any logical impossibilities which are not definitional or mathematical. A bachelor cannot be married, you cannot divide by zero. Things which seem contradictory in our world are often not in this loose realm of possibility: I could run faster than myself if I go back to when I am a baby and run around my earlier self as an older, faster self. But there are still certain things which can't happen: I can't be in two places at once as the same myself (the present and past mes are not actually the same self). The question is, does the nature of choice fall into these kinds of possibility? Is free will logically impossible?
Well, let's see. I can imagine myself eating a bowl of cereal, or not eating a bowl of cereal. Both scenarios are equally imaginable, whereas the concept of something really being two and another thing really being two and really adding them together and getting five is simply not imaginable. Perhaps, in fact, I am just fooled. I mean, I can imagine the earth being flat, but that doesn't make the earth flat. However, the flatness of the earth is not the same as possibility. The imagination can fool us into thinking something is real when it is not if it is logically possible; but logical impossibilities do not seem imaginable. Even with the hard determinist's argument in line, I can consistently imagine myself choosing to eat a bowl of cereal or to, say, hang-glide, instead. (Note that I am using imagination in the most basic sense, not the more loaded Romantic sense I will employ later for another blog. Also note that while I am using possibility in multiple blogs, the logic is not circular since these are separate arguments).
Perhaps we do not understand what we are imagining. I may not understand my mental faculties, may not understand the ways in which social norms, evolution, biology and other factors are influencing my choices. Perhaps if I did understand myself and the universe perfectly, imagining two possible actions would be impossible. These, unfortunately, are bad examples, though, because they are all arguments which proceed from things which operate in a realm of post-nomological possibility. That is to say, those things influencing my decision are not due to the metaphysical nature of choice, but to circumstances which may or may not impede my ability to choose. For example, if we say that I have the ability to walk, and then tie my legs to a chair, I still, in a sense, have the ability to walk. Circumstances have prevented me from being able to use that ability, but it is still a present ability. This too is a miss analogy, since it is still looking at the problem within post-nomological possibility. So we will remove it further: Let us say that my legs are cut off. We can still say that, if I had legs, I would be able to walk, since logically the metaphysical concept of walking is acceptable. So any arguments which say that we do not have free will because of fate, social construction, or other nomological and post-nomological circumstances, fail to appreciate the question of free will in terms of a pure metaphysics.
The argument of hard determinism operates in a pure logic world, and attempts to establish free will as false because actions can only either be caused or random. It is metaphysically in the nature of a person's choice, they say, that those choices be caused or random. My response to this is that metaphysical impossibilities cannot be imagined, and free will can be imagined. This is sort of like hunger. If I experience hunger, then I know that hunger is a real thing to experience. Even if a scientist is tweaking a brain in a vat that thinks it is Anthony, that mental state is experiencing something which really exists. More precisely phrased, feeling hungry makes you hungry. If I am physically satisfied, but have a disorder which makes me hungry when I have eaten enough, it is not that I am fooled into thinking I am hungry when I am not. It is in the nature of feeling hungry that makes one hungry; feeling as though you are in pain makes you actually in pain, even if what you think is causing you pain is actually not, and it is only your perception that it hurts which is making you hurt. I submit that free will is of this category of experience, that the sensation of freeness is what makes one free. Now, a scientist may learn to make a brain in a vat feel free, and so we can say, ah, but free will could still merely be an illusion! Here is where it gets tricky.
It is simpler with hunger, because the experience of hunger makes you hungry. On the other hand, one might experience no freedom and yet have free will, ostensibly, and one might experience freedom in a situation where one is not really free. The qualia of freeness does not mean that you are able to act upon your freedom: it is simply the imaginable experience of freedom which makes freedom possible. In other words, if I am sitting here feeling unfree, I can still imagine a situation where I do feel free, and so in a sense am still experiencing myself as the kind of being who COULD have free will. Essentially, the experience of this concept of freedom, not the experience of freedom itself, is much like experiencing hunger. Having experienced the concept of free will, I know that it is a possible state, because logical impossibilities cannot be admitted into the imagination. This is a sort of Cartesian argument, I suppose, and the strongest argument against it remains that we could be fooled that something is possible, when it is not. I reply that if this is the case, then we must come to question a great many other things which we deem possible. Furthermore, if we can be fooled that something is logically possible, then we could also be fooled whether something is logically impossible. If that is the case, and whether something can be imagined as impossible is not a valid test, then the concept of logical impossibility falls apart, and we are left in a world of total possibility, where even logic provides no impossibilities. If this happens then the hard determinist argument fails, since they use logic to disprove free will. So, logical impossibilities are needed because nomological and post-nomological arguments cannot disprove free will, but the fact that it is simply a person's judgment which renders a concept as logically impossible or possible which further makes it possible that I could choose to do A or B. I can consistently imagine myself doing either A or B; in other words, I experience myself as a free being whose freedom may be limited, or not limited, by circumstances. The hard determinist argument may cause me to say, "I cannot explain how a choice can be neither caused nor random," however, I can still hold this in view and experience myself as a being who can do A or B. Because their argument does not render this capability void, because when I go to make a choice I still see myself as being able to make a choice, the nature of this experience of freedom indicates that I am actually free.
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